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ASYMMETRIC PARENTHOOD
Katharine K. Baker *

*

Professor of Law and Associate Dean, Chicago-Kent College of Law.

1

What is it that makes someone financially responsible for a child? Perhaps surprisingly,
that is a remarkably difficult question for the law or common consensus to answer. There are
some situations in which it is relatively easy to decide that someone should be responsible,
usually those occur in the context of what is, at least in popular culture, our normative ideal: A
man and woman, married to each other, who had reproductive sex with each other in order to
produce and raise a child, and who proceed to do so 1 I will call this the binary biological ideal.
Our allegiance to this ideal is so strong that we continue to use it as a model for the child support
obligation, despite the fact that well over half of the children in this country do not spend their
childhood within the confines of the model. 2 Given that reality, it is not obvious that we should
continue to use this model in all situations. The more varied and diverse the reality of
parenthood becomes the more we need to understand why it is that certain people have
1

This seemingly overly detailed and dry description of the ideal is actually necessary.
As this article will show, a huge amount can turn on how the conception happened, whether the
parties were married, whether the parties intended to produce a child and whether the parties
willingly accepted parental responsibility.
2

Sara McLanahan, Gary Sandefur, Growing Up with a Single Parent: What Helps, What
Hurts 2 (1994) (AWell over half of this children born in 1992 spend all or some of their
childhood apart form one of their parents.@) There have not been significant enough changes in
either the divorce rate or the rate of children born to unmarried parents to suggest that the
numbers today are any different than they were in 1992. US Dept.of the Census, Population and
Family Characteristics.
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obligations to children while others do not.
The ALI seems remarkably uninterested in explaining the question of why someone
should be financially responsible for a child. This lack of curiosity and analysis contrasts, quite
sharply, with the ALI=s interest in exploring why someone might have custodial rights to a child.
The different treatment of non-traditional parents= rights and obligations presents an obvious
asymmetry in the ALI=s picture of parenthood.
Section I of this paper explores the different treatment of rights and obligations. It
contrasts how Chapter 2 of the Principles bestow rights with how Chapter 3 imposes obligations.
Put simply, Chapter 2 significantly expands the class of people entitled to parental rights;
Chapter 3 barely alters the traditional rules regarding who should be responsible for children.
Section II of this paper analyzes the implications of those differences. First, it shows how the
binary parent norm rejected in Chapter 2 is deeply embedded in chapter 3, both in determining
who is obligated and in determining how much an obligated parent owes. This means that
chapter 3 not only limits parenthood to two people, it treats as irrelevant all functional aspects of
parenthood. Functional relationship does not give rise to obligation and the obligation one has is
based on what is often an entirely hypothetical idea - that the two legal parents actually lived
together and shared resources. Second, the expansion of non-traditional parents= rights in
chapter 2, which expands the state=s role in child-rearing, is not accompanied by an expansion of
state responsibility for children. By increasing the number of people who can assert relationship
rights, chapter 2 necessarily increases the likelihood that courts, not parents, will be deciding
what is in a child=s best interest. Parents= rights are diminished and the state=s power is increased
without chapter 3 making any provision for diminishing parental obligation or increasing state
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responsibility. Third, the protection of established emotional relationships in chapter 2 without a
protection of established financial relationships in chapter 3 suggests a prioritization of
children=s emotional needs over their financial needs. The ALI opts to protect emotional reliance
more than financial reliance without any justification or explanation as to why. Finally, the one
justification that does emerge for finding non-traditional parents liable for support, i.e., an intent
to accept responsibility as a parent, is strikingly inconsistent with the ALI=s concurrent reliance
on state parentage acts, which reject intent as a basis for parenthood. It is also inconsistent with
the treatment of obligation elsewhere in the Principles. This leaves us with a good deal of
confusion about when and why intent to parent should matter in determining parental obligation.
In sum, Section II shows how the treatment of rights rejects the binary parent model and
the supremacy of biology, while embracing increased state participation in children=s emotional
well-being. In contrast, the treatment of obligation endorses the binary parent model and the
supremacy of biology while eschewing state responsibility for children=s financial well-being.
Section III, the Conclusion, explores some tentative justifications for this asymmetry. Given the
political realities of child support and our uncertainty about the answers to certain empirical
questions, it may be that the drafters of the ALI got it right. We may be better off living with an
asymmetric understanding of parenthood than with either a restrictive one in which both rights
and obligations are limited, or a more capacious one, in which both rights and obligations are
expanded.
I. The Categories
A. Chapter 2 and Relationship Categories
Chapter 2 of the Principles outlines who has standing to assert relationship rights with a
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child. A person who asserts relationship rights claims a right to have the state protect his or her
relationship with a child. Chapter 2 bestows relationship rights on four categories of people:
legal parents, parents by estoppel, de facto parents and biological parents who are not legal
parents. 3 The last category, a biological parent who is not the legal parent, is the most
straightforward. A birth mother or sperm donor who does not intend to be the legal parent but
wants to retain, through contract, certain relationship rights, can do so. 4 The first category, legal
parents, may seem the most obvious, though as the next section makes clear, the category of
legal parent is far more fluid and contextual than one might initially think. The two other
categories codified in '2.03 need more explanation.
A parent by estoppel is someone who lived with the child for at least two years or since
the child=s birth and either: reasonably believed he was the biological father of the child and
accepted responsibility as father of the child, found out he was not the biological father of the
child (after believing he was) but continued to accept responsibilities as father of the child, or
accepted responsibilities as a parent of the child pursuant to an agreement with the child=s other
parent or parents. 5 The parent by estoppel category was created in order to prevent legal parents
3

Procedurally what this means is that anyone in these categories has standing to
participate in and indeed initiate a child custody proceeding. Section 2.04 delineates who may
Abring an action under this Chapter@ and/or Abe notified of an participate as a party in an action
filed by another.@ 2.04(1)
4

There may be some ambiguity around what constitutes biological parent, however. Is
an egg donor who did not carry the child to term, or a gestational surrogate who did not provide
an egg a biological parent? The ALI preserves rights for biological parents who, through prior
agreements with the child=s legal parent(s), have retained some parental rights or responsibilities,
Sections 2.04(1)(d) and 2.18(2)(b), but it does not define biological parents..
5

If the child is under age 2, the agreement with the child=s parent must have been formed
prior to the child=s birth.
5

from blocking a functional parent=s potential custodial rights on the basis of biology or legality.
For the most part, parents by estoppel and legal parents are treated comparably by the ALI, 6
though parents by estoppel may not hold the full panoply of constitutional rights that legal
parents do. 7

Nonetheless, both legal parents and parents by estoppel have a presumptive right

to the amount of custodial time allocated in a uniform rule of statewide application. 8 They also
both have the right to object if a de facto parent is awarded a majority of the custodial time. 9
A De Facto parent is someone who, for not less than two years, lived with the child and,
for reasons other than financial compensation and pursuant to an agreement with a legal parent
to form a parent-child relationship, performed at least half of the caretaking for the child. This
category allows people who have developed a substantial emotional relationship with a child to
assert custodial rights. De Facto parents have a form of lesser parental status. They have the
right to petition for custodial time, but this right is temporally limited B they must assert it
within 6 months of having lived with the child;10 unlike parents-by-estoppel, they cannot assert a

6

AA parent by estoppel is afforded all of the privileges of a legal parent under this
Chapter.@ P.110
7

For instance, it is not clear whether a parent by estoppel should be considered a parent
for constitutional purposes, and thereby protected from certain forms of state interference,
though it is unlikely that they are. See Emily Buss, AParental Rights,@88 Va. L. Rev. 635, 642
(2002) (Athe ALI gives no indication that the custody proceeding can transform parents by
estoppel into the sort of parents entitled to special constitutional protection under the Due
Process Clause . . .@)
8

'2.08(1)(a) (Aa legal parent or a parent by estoppel who has performed a reasonable
share of parenting functions [is entitled to]. . . not less than a presumptive amount of custodial
time set by a uniform rule of statewide application.@
9

Section 2.18(a)(a).

10

2.04(1)(c)
6

right based on the provision of food or shelter or services (they must have provided
caretaking);11 and their entitlement is supposed to be less than that which legal parents or parents
by estoppel receive.12
B. Chapter 3 and Obligation Categories
Chapter 3 outlines who should be held responsible for child support and how much they
should be held responsible for. There are only three categories of potential obligors: legal
parents, parents by estoppel and people required by state law to support a child despite
termination of that person=s parental rights.13 To make matters particularly confusing for the
uninitiated, parents by estoppel under Section 3.03 are not defined the same way as parents by
estoppel under Section 2.03. Whereas Section 2.03 is designed to estop a legal parent from
barring a non-legal parent from asserting custodial rights, Section 3.03 is designed to estop a
non-legal parent from denying a support obligation. Anyone who is estopped from denying a
child support obligation under Section 3.03 is entitled to custodial rights as a parent by estoppel
under Section 2.03, but the obverse does not hold.14 In other words, the ogligor is always

11

Parenting functions include caretaking functions, but they may also involve providing
economic support, non-caretaking labor for the household and decision-making. 2.03(6).
12

2.18(1)(a). The court Ashould not allocate the majority of custodial responsibility to a
de facto parent over the objection of a legal parent or a parent by estoppel who is fit and willing.
..A
13

This last category is probably limited to those rare instances in which a state
terminates someone=s parental rights (probably for reasons of abuse or neglect) but nonetheless
demands a support obligation from that person. In any other instance it would be inconsistent
with other provisions of the Principles, see section 3.03 cmts d and e and discussion infra . to
hold someone obliged to pay, without allowing him or her to assert custodial rights.
14

AIn some cases estoppel may be mutual, but in other cases it may not be. Whether the
parties are estopped to deny parenthood for the purpose of custodial responsibility is determined
7

entitled to rights, but the rights holder is not always obligated to pay.
Chapter 3 makes very clear that non-legal parents should only be obligated to pay child
support in rare circumstances. The first part of Section 3.03 states that a parenthood by estoppel
for support purposes should be found Aonly@ in Aexceptional@ circumstances, and only in cases in
which the potential obligor=s Aaffirmative conduct@ renders an estoppel appropriate. The
Drafters were clear that obligation should grow from deliberate action not circumstance.15
The second part of Section 3.03 limits the circumstances in which a parent by estoppel
for support purposes can be found even further. Section 3.03(2) discourages the imposition of
obligation if the potential obligor did not Asupplant[] the child=s opportunity to develop a
relationship with an absent parent and to look to that parent for support.@ Nor should an
obligation be found if there are two other parents Awho owe the child a duty of support and are
able and available to provide support.@
The concern about supplanting the child=s opportunity to develop a relationship with his
or her legal father in '3.03(2) parallels, or perhaps gives content to, the affirmative conduct
requirement in '3.03(1). It does so, however, without clearly defining what constitutes action
sufficient to warrant an obligation. Illustration #2 in ' 3.03 explains that an obligation can be
imposed if a step-parent counsels his wife not to pursue child support against the legal father and

by Chapter 2 . .. However, estoppel is always mutual if a child-support obligation is actually
imposed under [Chapter 3].@ 3.03 cmt d.
15

Moreover, by specifically stating that a Chapter 2 parent by estoppel is not necessarily
a Chapter 3 parent by estoppel, the drafters must have meant that Aaccepting full and permanent
responsibilities as a parent, pursuant to an agreement with the child=s parent(s)@ which entitles
one to relationship rights in Chapter 2 should not mean the same thing as Aaffirmative conduct@
constituting Aan explicit or implicit agreement or undertaking . . . to assume a parental support
obligation@ which obliges one in Chapter 3.
8

urges her to pursue termination of the legal father=s support obligation.16 The far more likely
scenario involves less dramatic action. Suppose the step-father simply assumes the duty to
support so that the legal mother does not bother to pursue child support.17 The step-father may
even say he is happy to help, which can be true but fall far short of encouraging the legal parent
not to pursue child support. The step-parent may also develop a bond with the child, though not
because he deliberately tried to exclude the legal father. It is incredibly common for the legal
father to simply drift away.18

The non-legal parent=s Aaffirmative conduct@ in these very

common situations often consists of little more than filling the vacuum left by the absence of the
other legal parent. Once established, however, that relationship can be a powerful and important
presence in both the child=s and the custodial parent=s life.19 It is a relationship that entitles the
step-parent to relationship rights as a De Facto parent, but (apparently) not the child or his
mother to a right of support.
The restrictive conditions under which Chapter 3 is willing to impose obligations on nonlegal parents demonstrates a desire to rely on legal determinations of parental identity in order to
determine child support obligations. Although this might seem like an appropriate, clear rule only legal parents should be obligated to pay - an examination of how the law of parental
16

Se Illustration #2, p. 416.

17

Enforcement proceedings are emotionally and physically costly. She is much less
likely to pursue if there is enough other money available.
18

Frank Furstenburg and Kathleen Mullan Harris, When Fathers Matter / Why Fathers
Matter: The Impact of Paternal Involvement on the Offspring of Adolescent Mothers in The
Politics of Pregnancy: Adolescent Sex and Public Policy 217 (D. Rhode ed.) (1993)
19

Children living with stepfathers are more likely to define their stepfather as part of
their family than they are to define their biological father as a family member. F. Furstenburg
9

identity operates shows the category of Alegal parent@ to be much messier than might be
expected. The Uniform Parentage Act, and virtually all state parentage acts, presume certain
people to be legal parents. For women, the rule works without incident most of the time:
whoever gives birth to the child is the mother.20 Fatherhood is, and always has been, more
complicated. Most parentage acts incorporate the common law presumption that a man married
to the mother at the time of birth or conception is the child=s father.21 The man listed on the
birth certificate is also often presumed to be the legal father,22 as is a man who resides with a
newborn child and Aopenly holds out the child as his natural child.@23 It is not uncommon for
these presumptions to clash with each other or with biological evidence.24 In cases where non-

and C Nord, 47 J. Marriage Fam 893, 899 (1985).
20

Surrogacy arrangements can make motherhood determination complicated also. A
gestational surrogate may well not be the genetic mother of a child. An intending mother who
gets impregnated using an ovum from another woman is not a genetic mother either. Almost all
of these new arrangements are accompanied by private contracts in which the parental rights of
the relevant parties are spelled out. For the most part, courts accept the legitimacy of these
contracts and let private ordering determine both rights and obligations. See Katharine K. Baker,
Bargaining or Biology ---- Cornell J. of Law and Public Policy -----.
21

Uniform Parentage Act '204(a)(1)and (2) (2002).

22

See e.g., 750 Ill. Comp. Stat 45/5(a)(2) (2003); Ala. Code '' 26-17-1 - 26-17-21; Cal.
Fam. Code '7611(c)(I) (2004).
23

UPA '204(a)(5); Cal. Fam. Code ' 7611(d)(2004); C.R.S. 19-4-105(1)(d) (Colo.

2003).
24

NAH v. SLS, 9 P.3d 354, 357 (Colo. 2000) (Husband was identified on the birth
certificate as the father and accepted the child as his own, but genetics testing showed another
man was the biological father); Davis v. La Brec, 549 S.E.2d 76 (Ga. 2001) (Man in a long term
relationship with the mother was named as the father on the birth certificate and obtained full
legal custody of the child, but years later, a DNA test proved another man was the biological
father); County v. R.K., 757 A.2d 319 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000) (Man signed a voluntary
admission of paternity and was believed to be the father for ten years, but paternity test revealed
he was not).
10

biological presumptions clash, courts sometimes rely on biological evidence,25 but other times
simply make a Best Interest of the Child determination in order to determine paternity.26
Comparably, in cases in which there has already been a paternity judgment without genetic
testing, courts can refuse to order such testing even if a legal father has new reason to believe
that he is not the genetic father.27 Thus, neither the rules themselves nor judicial interpretation
of those rules suggest that the Alegal parent@ is easily defined.
Acknowledging the confusion built into legal parentage determinations has important
implications for the ALI Principles. Chapter 2 makes clear that legal parents have custodial
rights, but one=s status as legal parent can change quite quickly. Section 2.04(1)(e) states that
once one has been allocated Aresponsibility or decisionmaking authority@ under Chapter 2, one
has continued standing to assert custodial rights, but what of someone who initiates a
proceeding as a legal parent and finds out before an adjudication is complete that he is not one?28
Obligation attaches in Chapter 3 automatically at the legal determination of paternity, but that
legal determination can easily change after custodial rights have been established. This could
mean that someone who got custodial rights as legal father would retain those rights but could

25

In re Marriage of Rebecca & David P., 54 Cal. App. 4th 471

26

See NAH v. SLS, 9 P.3d 357 (Colo 2000) and Davis v. LaBrec, 549 SE2d 76 (Ga.

27

In re Paternity of Cheryl, 746 NE2d 488 (Mass. 2001).

2001).

28

See In re Roberts, 649 NE2d 1344 (Ill 1995) (In the midst of a divorce and custody
battle over a child whom the husband and legal father presumed to be his own, the court
determined that the husband was not the legal father of the child. The court nonetheless found
that the husband had standing in the custody battle because at the initiation of the suit, he was the
legal father. )
11

lose his obligation to pay because a new legal father had been found.
C. Summary
The Principles create different categories of individuals who may have relationship rights
to children under Chapter 2 or financial obligation to children under Chapter 3. Chapter 2 gives
relationship rights to legal parents, biological parents who contracted for them, De Facto parents
and parents by estoppel. Chapter 3 limits financial responsibility almost exclusively to legal
parents, with minor allowances for some parents by estoppel and abusive parents.29 A person
who has a right to estop a legal parent from contesting his or her parental status in chapter 2 has
custodial rights equal to a legal parent, but that same person is not necessarily himself estopped
from denying a support obligation in chapter 3. Comparably a person who was a legal parent at
the time custodial rights were originally determined will always have standing to assert parental
rights, but if that same person loses his status as legal parent, he may well be relieved of his
support obligation.
The best way to summarize the distinctions between Chapters 2 and 3 may be to
understand what each chapter does with and to the concept of legal parentage. The comments to
Chapter 3 state that the determination of legal paternity is Aa matter outside the scope of these
Principles.@30 Presumably, in passing that buck, the drafters meant to avoid the messy
determinations involving competing presumptions of fatherhood just discussed, but there is at
least a partial tautology involved in doing so. The reason courts determine legal parentage is to

29

It also provides for the very limited category of parents who are ordered to pay child
support despite the severing of their legal status as parents. See supra note .
30

P. 418.
12

determine who has rights and responsibilities with regard to children. The purpose of Chapters 2
and 3 of the Principles is to determine who has rights and responsibilities with regard to children.
In determining rights and responsibilities, one is determining parenthood. Thus, in a very
practical sense, the purpose of the Principles is to determine legal parentage. How could the
very purpose of the Principles be beyond their scope?
The answer to this question lies in the way in which the ALI severs rights and
responsibilities. Traditionally, whoever had rights had responsibilities and the only people who
had rights and responsibilities were parents. The Principles now suggest a very different
structure. People can have rights without having responsibilities, and a determination of legal
parentage really only matters for the imposition of responsibility. Chapter 2 lays out who should
be entitled to rights without much care for who the legal parents are. In doing so, Chapter 2 does
a great deal of work in determining who is able to enjoy the benefits of parenthood and it makes
clear that there can be more than two parents.31 Parentage determinations are thus not outside
the scope of Chapter 2. Chapter 3, on the other hand, restricts responsibility to legal parents and
those rare individuals who have, in exceptional circumstances, willingly agreed to assume full
parental responsibilities. By leaving it to others, i.e., those deciding legal parentage,32 to decide
who should shoulder the responsibilities of parenthood, Chapter 3 ignores the very questions that
Chapter 2 resolves.

31

Those non-traditional categories of people who are now entitled to parental rights all
have the word Aparent@ in them, Aparents-by-estoppel,@ Ade facto parents,@ Abiological parents
who have a prior agreement with legal parents.@
32

The others would presumably be drafters of a Parentage Acts and the judges who
interpret them.
13

II. The Implications
A. Two-Parent Model
By adopting an expansive view of parental rights, Chapter 2 rejects the binary parent
model. More than two people can have relationship rights to children. This is evident not only in
the extension of relationship rights to de facto parents, but in the incorporation of biological
parents who are not legal parents but have an agreement with a legal parent to reserve some
parental rights. Chapter 2 even contemplates the idea that two parents could agree to have a third
party assume full parental duties and thereby become a parent-by-estoppel.33
Chapter 3 is far less receptive to the idea of multilateral responsibility. As discussed,
non-legal parents can only be held responsible in exceptional circumstances and are particularly
unlikely to be held accountable if there are Atwo [other] parents who owe the child a duty of
support.@ More practically, the Child-Support Formula adopted in '3.05 embodies not only a
two-parent norm, but a two-parents-who-have-shared-a-household norm. AThe marginal
expenditure measure requires that a child support obligor continue to contribute to the marginal
support of the child as he would if he were sharing a home with the child and the other parent.@34
33

2.03(b)(iii) and (iv) suggests that a biological mother and father (who would be the
legal parents of the child) could enter into a co-parenting agreement with a third person in which
that third person agreed to raise the child with full parental rights and responsibilities. If such an
agreement was in place, the third party would acquire parent-by-estoppel status if he or she had
lived with the child since birth or for at least two years. The notes to Chapter 2 suggests that it
is unlikely that a parent-by-estoppel relationship will be formed if there are two legal parents,
but it is not impossible. P. 115
34

P. 444. See also p. 427(A non-residential parent Ahas an interest in contributing no
more to the support of a child than if he were living with the child in a two parent household,
that is, in not being required to pay any more than he would were the family intact.@) and P. 445.
(ABase percentages . . . may be selected . . . from estimates of marginal expenditure on children .
. . in two-parent families.@)
14

What someone owes his or her child is determined based on the standard of living the child
would enjoy if the obligor were living with the residential parent (and she was not living with
somebody else). This formula may well reflect the best way to ensure fair and efficient transfer
of resources to children born to the biological binary parent ideal, but it uses as a baseline a
nonmajoritian norm. Children are just as likely not to live in a family composed of two
biologically related parents and biological siblings as they are to live within that model.35 Thirty
percent of the children in this country are born to non-married mothers. To base the entire child
support structure on the binary biological ideal when it is so transparently not reality for millions
of children seems a little odd.
Allocating responsibility based on this model without considering the behavior and
circumstances that led to the obligation also seems a little odd. A man who never wanted and
never intended to have a child, but sired one in a one night stand, owes the exact same amount of
child support as a comparably earning man who intended to sire and willingly reared his child.
The quality and content of the adult-child relationship that is critical to the assessment of rights
under Chapter 2, is irrelevant to the assessment of obligation. Moreover, what the man in the
one night stand owes is a function of an entirely hypothetical situation. Section 3.05 asks a court
to determine what he would contribute if he were living and sharing resources with the mother

35

Stacy Furukawa, US Dept of Commerce, The Living Arrangements of Children:
Summer 19991 1. This study, based on 1991 data, found that only one out of two children lived
with their biological parents and their biological siblings. See also Dowd at 27 (same conclusion
based on 1994data).

15

and child, despite the fact that he has never lived with the mother or the child.
The drafters of the Principles justify this scheme in the name of alleviating the Aeconomic
plight of children in single-parent households.@36 Children of single parents were clearly of
critical concern to the drafters. AWidespread economic inadequacy in one-parent families is not
only a grievous harm to children; it is also an unwise underinvestment in a vital social
resource.@37 For sure, though, we could alleviate much of that suffering by casting the obligor
net wider. We would not even have to cast it in arbitrary directions. Indeed, we could simply net
in the very same people who are entitled to relationship rights in Chapter 2.
Such an approach would not only deepen the pool of resources available to children. It
would better reflect parental reality as it is experienced by both adults and children. In many
communities, serial fatherhood is the norm. AThe responsibilities of fathers are carried from one
household to the next as [men] migrate from one marriage to the next. Some men who become
stepparents or surrogate parents in a new household often transfer their loyalties to their new
family.@38 AFor men, marriage and co-residence usually define responsibilities to children.
Regardless of their biological ties to children, men share time and resources with the children of
their wives or female partner.@39 Of children who live in mother-only households, 20% live with

36

P. 429

37

P. 424

38

Frank Furstenburg and Kathleen Mullan Harris, When Fathers Matter / Why Fathers
Matter: The Impact of Paternal Involvement on the Offspring of Adolescent Mothers in The
Politics of Pregnancy: Adolescent Sex and Public Policy 217 (D. Rhode ed.) (1993)
39

Judith Seltzer, Consequences of Marital Dissolution For Children, 20 Am. Rev.
Sociol. 235, 237 (1994)
16

an adult male.40 Of children that live in father-only households, 40% live with an adult female.41
Of children in single-parent households generally, another 20% live with an adult of the same
sax sex as their residential parent. 42 These children, and there are literally millions of them,43
do not live the biological binary parent ideal but they are living with at least two adults, many of
whom will be entitled to parental rights. Chapter 3 ignores these functional relationships and
instead links obligation to determinations of legal parenthood made elsewhere and to a model of
parental relationships that applies to less than half of the children in this country.

B. The Expansion of State Power
In granting relationship rights to non-legal parents, the Principles also endorse an
expanded view of state power. The state has the right to protect a child=s emotional well-being
by ensuring the continuation of certain relationships even if the custodial parent(s) want to end
or diminish the strength of those relationships.44 With this expansion of state power comes a
diminishment of negative parental rights.
Others have written about the ALI=s weak allegiance to parental rights.45 By giving non40

Dowd at 28

41

Id.

42

Id.

43

44% of children who live with a single parent also have a another adult present in the
household. Http://www.divorces.com/stats.html
44

Theoretically, the state can do this pursuant to the parens patraie power that allows the
state to act on behalf of children because children are not fully able to protect themselves. See
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 US 158, 162 (1944).
45

See Buss, supra note .
17

parents rights to petition for custody and decision-making authority, the ALI weakens Athe
primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children.@ 46 Traditionally, parents were
protected from state interference into upbringing decisions.47 Only if the state could prove by
clear and convincing evidence that a parent was abusing or neglecting her children, could the
state usurp a parent=s role.48 In the famous string of substantive due process cases announcing
parental rights,49 the justification that emerged for protecting parental rights stemmed from the
belief that parents, not the state, should socialize children. States would not be particularly good
at socializing a diverse population,50 and parents have a protected interest in socializing their

46

Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972).

47

Parents had the right to make decisions about discipline, religion, education (within
limits) and association. See Katharine Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive State:
The Need for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed 70 Va. L.
Rev. 870, 884-85 (1984). Mandatory school attendance laws abridge a parent=s right to not
educate his or her child, but parents are given wide latitude to provide whatever education they
want. And, if the reasoning seems sound enough, parents can get an exemption from mandatory
school attendance laws. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
48

Santosky v. Kramer455 US 745 (1982).

49

The string includes, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 US 390 (1923), Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 US 510 (1925), Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 US 158 (1944); Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 US 205 1972). The Supreme Court=s most recent foray into the parental rights area, Troxel
v. Granville, 530 US 57 (2000), suggests a much more limited enthusiasm for parental rights.
50

A[A]ffirmative sponsorship of ethical, religious or political beliefs is something we
expect the state not to attempt in a society constitutionally committed to the ideal of individual
liberty and freedom of choice.@ Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638-39 (1979). In Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 US 390 (1923), the Supreme Court noted if the state were to assume the job of
socialization children, the result would be a kind homogeneity that is Awholly different from [the
individualism] upon which our institutions rest.@ In Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,
503-04 (1977) , the Court held A[i]t is through the family that we inculcate and pass down many
of our most cherished values, moral and cultural.@ See also, Bartlett, supra note at 890
(describing the view that protecting parental rights serve instrumental goals).
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children as they want to.51 Moreover, parents are likely to know their children best and
therefore be best able to act in their children=s best interest.52 By allowing non-parents to
compete with others to socialize children, the ALI diminishes the control and the ability of
parents to Abring up [a] child in the way he should go.@53
Arguably, however, the negative parental rights that the substantive due process clause
protects have never extended to non-married parents.54 That is because a non-married parent has
the positive parental right to invoke the state=s judgement when challenging a decision of another
parent.55 When non-married parents disagree, it is the state that makes the very decisions that
negative parental rights prevent the state from making for married parents.56

51

Justice Steward has argued:
If a State were to attempt to force the breakup of a natural family, over the
objections of parents and their children, without some showing of unfitness and
for the sole reason that to do so was thought to be in the children=s best interest, I
should have little doubt that the State would have intruded impermissibly on the
Aprivate realm of family life which the state cannot enter.@ Smith v. OFFER, 431
U.S. 816, 862-63 (1977)
See also Stephen Gilles, On Educating and Rearing Children:? A Parentalist Manifesto, 63 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 937 (1996) (arguing that the parental rights doctrine protects critical expressive
rights for parents because raising children is a form of self-expression)
52

Parham v. J.R. 442 US 584, 602 (1979) (Parents are entitled to a presumption that
they are acting in the best interest of their children.)
53

See Prince, 321 U.S. at 164.

54

All of the parents in the original parents rights cases, see supra note , were married
and asserting their parental rights jointly. The recent case that gave only a lukewarm
endorsement to the notion of negative parental rights, Troxel v. Granville, involved a parent who
had never married the father of her children and who had split with him before he died.
55

See Katharine K. Baker, Property Rules Meet Feminist Needs: Respecting Autonomy
by Valuing Connection, 59 Ohio St. L. J. 1523, 1545-46 (1998)
56

Mentry v. Mentry, 190 Cal Rptr 843, 850 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (court evaluates
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The rights that a parent by estoppel or de facto parent asserts under Chapter 2 will likely
be asserted against a non-married parent, i.e. someone whose negative parental rights are already
severely restricted by the positive parental rights of another parent. Thus, by giving rights to
parents by estoppel and de facto parents, Chapter 2 may not be infringing that significantly on a
parent=s negative parental rights because that parent=s rights are already compromised by her
single status.57
Perhaps, then, because they will emerge in situations in which the negative parental
rights of the parent(s) can already be challenged, Chapter 2's entitlements do not pose a
particularly large threat to the parenting practices of legal parents. There is at least one group of
parents whose rights are likely to be significantly restricted though, the single custodial parent
who has an absentee-but-still-legal co-parent. Ironically, this is the same often poor custodial
parent that the comments to Chapter 3 say we must help. The absentee-but-still legal parent does
not usually challenge the parenting decisions of the custodial single parent. His absentee status

decisions about religious practices); Felton v. Felton, 418 NE2d 606, 611 (Mass. 1981) (id.);
Jarett v. Jarett, 400 NE2d 421, 427 (Ill. 1980)(custodial mother loses custody because of her
belief that she need not marry her sexual partner); Peterson v. Peterson, 434 NW2d 732, 738
(S.D. 1989) (it is up to court to determine Arealistic needs of the children.@) Moreover, the
Supreme Court has just held that an unmarried non-custodial father does not have standing to
challenge unconstitutional state practices that effect his daughter. See Elk Grove Village v.
Newdow C US ---- (2004). This is standing that the constitution clearly affords to married
parents if they proceed together. See Yoder, supra note ; Meyer, supra note .
57

To be a parent by estoppel one has to have lived with the child for two years (or since
birth, '3.03(1)(b)(3)) and agreed with both parents that one should Aaccept full and permanent
responsibility as parent.@ It is possible, but not likely, that two married parents would agree to
have a third person to accept full and permanent responsibility. To be a de facto parent, one has
to have lived with the child for two years and assumed more than half of the caretaking
functions. Again, it is possible that a married couple would welcome someone like this into their
home, but not particularly likely. Thus, de facto parents are not likely to be competing with
married parents either.
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precludes it. The absence of the absentee parent gives the single parent freedom, but it also often
compels the single parent to look for caretaking help from a de facto parent.58 The person who
(for free) provides that caretaking help can become a de facto parent and thereby diminish the
rights of the single parent.
To be sure, there is a certain justice to diminishing the single parent=s rights in these
situations. If a parent has asked a non-parent to share caretaking burdens, she may have to be
prepared to share caretaking rights. Moreover, there are some situations in which the new de
facto rules do little more than curtail the rights of the absentee-but still-legal parent.59
There are other situations in which the assertion of such rights is considerably more
controversial. The infamous Painter v. Bannister60 case is an example. In Painter, maternal
grandparents who had taken care of their grandson after the death of their daughter were able to
take custody from the child=s father when the father asked to take his son back. The case
generated considerable commentary,61 many people thinking it perfectly appropriate for the

58

De Facto parents are also likely to emerge in situations in which one divorced parent
re-marries a person who assumes primary caretaking responsibility for a child from the first
marriage. The step-parent who assumes such a role can be a de facto parent, but the relative
infringement she will cause is small because each legal parent=s parenting decisions are already
subject to challenge by the other parent.
59

Consider Illustration #2, in the comments to '2.18. Three year old Perry lived with
his mother, Lois, and grandmother, Glenna, since birth. Lois performed more than half of the
caretaking. The legal father, Hank, had seen Perry only six times and had never provided child
support. When Lois went to jail, Glenna had standing as a de facto parent and could be awarded
a majority of the custodial responsibility. If she did not have standing, Hank would have had
sole rights and responsibility for Perry. Making room for Glenna to assert rights in this case
seems unquestionably sound.
60

Painter v. Bannister, 140 NW2d 152(Iowa 1966).

61

For a discussion of Painter=s influence, see Gilbert A. Holmes, The Tie That Binds:
21

father to ask for help from his in-laws and not at all fair to deprive him of custody later. It is
clear that Chapter 2 would treat the grandparents in Painter as de facto parents with standing to
assert a custody claim.62
Consider also what would happen if we slightly tweaked the facts of one of the ALI=s
examples. The mother in illustration #3 in Chapter 3 has been institutionalized with a mental
inllness.63 The father has custodial rights but because of his work schedule, the child resides
with grandmother during the week (or gets dropped off at grandmother=s before breakfast and
picked up after she has gone to sleep). The ALI makes clear that the grandmother in this
situation would qualify as a de facto parent, and it also makes clear that Aordinarily, [she would
have] no duty of support.@64

What this means is that if father begins to disagree with how

Grandmother is raising the child or if he re-marries and would like to have the child stay in his
home during the day because his new wife will willingly assume the role of caretaker, he may
well not be able to do so.65

The Constitutional Rights of Children to Maintain Relationships with Parent-Like Individuals,
53 Md. L. Rev 358, 384 (1994).
62

It is also likely that, although there would be a presumption against awarding them a
majority of the custodial time, the circumstances (Painter lived in California; the Bannisters lived
in Iowa) might allow for the Bannisters to retain a majority of the custodial time. Section
2.18(1)(2) allows a court to award a majority of the custodial responsibility to a de facto parent
over the objection of a legal parent if the Aavailable alternatives would cause harm to the child.@
63
64

See Illustration #3, chpt. 3 at 414.
P. 414

65

The grandmother will have standing in any custodial hearing and if the parties=
disagree, the ALI offers competing guidance: grandmother should not get a majority of the
custodial time because she is Aonly@ a de facto parent, but if the parties disagree, the court should
look to past practices. Past practices suggest that grandmother should get a majority of the
custodial time. Thus, it is unclear what the grandmother would get, but it is very likely she
22

Regardless of how one comes down on the question of whether the de facto parents
should get significant custodial awards in these situations, one fact is plain. Giving de facto
parents rights increases state involvement in the child-rearing process. The more people with
claims to relationship rights, the more people who can petition a court to alter or solidify a
custodial arrangement, and the more a court ends up deciding what is in a child=s best interest.
Giving the state authority in these situations and recognizing that the state routinely
exercises its authority in cases involving unmarried parents, demonstrates increased comfort with
state participation in child-rearing decisions. Changing norms with regard to marriage and
parenting, coupled with the ALI=s expansive view of relationship rights means that the state now
has ultimate decision-making authority for at least half of the children in this country. Chapter 2
soundly endorses this increased state participation, while Chapter 3 specifically eschews any
increased state financial responsibility for children.66 The ALI diffuses parents= rights without
diffusing parents= obligation.67
2. Emotional Over Material Needs
The Drafters explicitly acknowledge that their goal in protecting relationship rights in
chapter 2 is to protect children=s emotional well-being.68 Embracing an expansive approach to

would get substantial custody time against the wishes of the primary parent.
66

See infra ...

67

The state could diffuse parents= obligation either by assuming some of the support
duty itself, as virtually every other industrialized country does, see Social Security
Administration, Research Report #65, SSA Publication No. 13-11805, Social Security Programs
Throughout the World - 1997 xxvi xx-xxxv, xxvi, or by imposing obligation on the people that
are dissipating traditional rights.
68

AThe continuity of existing parent-child attachments after the break-up of a family unit
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children=s emotional health while at the same time maintaining a restricted, traditional approach
to children=s financial well-being suggests one of two things: Either the Drafters thought that
children=s emotional health was more important than their financial health or they thought that
diminishment of traditional parental rights was not as significant a state interference as the
imposition of financial obligation on a non-traditional parent would be.
Consider Illustration #4 in Chapter 3, the kind of scenario in which someone is likely to
have de facto parent rights under Chapter 2, but not have financial responsibility under Chapter
3. Fred, a widowed father of two, cohabited with Allen for five years. Then they separated.
During their cohabitation Fred and Allen shared their earnings and the children benefitted from
the increased household income. Assume also that Fred and Allen shared caretaking
responsibilities, with Allen doing as much as Fred.69 Allen would have custodial rights as a de
facto parent, but, absent Aaffirmative conduct . . . [indicating] . . . an agreement to assume a
parental support obligation@ B and even then only in Aexceptional@ circumstance B Allen would
not be responsible for any child support. 70
Perhaps this makes sense because a child=s emotional well-being is simply more
important than his material well-being. Generations of happy, productive people who were raised
without many resources by loving parents or quasi-parents might compel such a conclusion.

is a factor critical to the child=s well-being. Such attachments are thought to affect the child=s
sense of identity and later ability to trust and form healthy relationships@ ALI Comments, p. 98.
69

There could be any of a number of reasons for this, including the rather benign one
that Allen=s schedule afforded him more flexibility and therefore it was easier for him to attend
to the children=s schedules.
70

The Comments make clear that Allen is not responsible for child support even though
Fred is a widower. There is no other parent available to provide support.
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What is odd, though, is that the ALI does not cite any data supporting this conclusion, nor does it
even mention the fact that it is treating emotional relationships as more important than financial
ones. Perhaps then the issue is really that, regardless of what actually is more important to the
child, the child perceives the emotional relationship as more important. In other words, in an
important psychological sense, the child relies on the emotional relationship. This is the
argument that various scholars have put forward when advocating expansive notions of
parenthood.71 The problem with this as a rationale for the ALI is that Chapter 2 specifically
rejects reliance as a rationale. The Afocus [is] on function, rather than on detrimental reliance.@72
To the extent that Chapter 2 invokes a concept other than function, it suggests that the
Aexpectation of the parties@ [as to the relationship continuing] can be relevant.73 Why, then,
cannot the focus for obligation be on function and expectation also? If the concern is
consistency, certainly Fred=s children will experience more consistency if they can count on
some financial assistance from Allen, rather than suffer a significant decline in their standard of
living.74 Empirical work suggests that it is the relative decline in income, rather than the
71

See Bartlett, supra note at 903-906; Naomi Cahn, Reframing Child Custody DecisionMaking, 58 Ohio St. L. J. 1, 49-50 (1997)
72

AWhile these circumstances typically contain a component of reliance by the
individual claiming parent status, the goal of the Chapter is to protect parent-child relationship
presumed to have developed under these various circumstances rather than reliance itself.
Accordingly, the requirements of ' 2.03(1)(b) focus on function, rather than on detrimental
reliance.@
73

Comments, p. 112

74

AStepfathers are an important source of children=s income. . . Children who live with
stepfathers generally benefit from these men=s investments in improved housing and
neighborhood location and from step father contributions to daily needs.@ Seltzer, Consequences
of Marital Dissolution for Children, 10 Am Rev. Sociol. 235, 250 (1994).
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absolute income level, that is most likely to hurt children.75 The recent trend among courts that
impose obligation on non-traditional parents has been to look to the extent of the reliance by the
child, the custodial parent or both.76 The ALI appears to reject this trend. By refusing to let
obligation grow from function, reliance or expectation, the ALI preferences emotional
connections over financial ones without giving us a reason why.
Possibly, then, the ALI Drafters simply thought it less intrusive for the state to interfere
with traditional parental rights than it was for the state to impose nontraditional obligation. The
liberty taken from traditional parents by diminishing their rights might be seen as less important
than the property we would take from non-traditional parents if we imposed a child support
obligation on them. Construing the relationship of rights and obligation in this way, particularly
in light of the fact that divorce and non-marital births have already dissipated the strength of
parental rights, may make sense, but it actually reverses both traditional liberal thinking and
more contemporary communitarian thinking. John Locke wrote , A[t]he power. . . that parents
have over their children, [arise] from that duty which is incumbent on them, to take care of their
75

See McLanahan and Sandeffur, Growing Up with a Single Parent: What Helps, What
Hurts 94 (1994) (AThese finding provide strong evidence that it is not just low income per se but
the loss of economic resources associated with family disruption that is a major source of lower
achievement of children of divorce.@ See also JS Wallerstein and JB Kelly, Surviving the BreakUp: How Children and Parents Cope with Divorce (1980) and JS. Wallerstein and S. Blakeslee,
Second Chances: Men, Women and Children a Decade After Divorce (1990) (Children feel and
resent the sense of loss associated with the decreased standard of living after separation)
76

In re Paternity of Cheryl, 746 NE2d 488, 496 (Mass. 2001) (ACheryl knew and relied
on [the man who had been supporting her] as her father@); Monmouth County v. R.K., 757 A2d
319, 331 (NJ Super. Ct. Ch. Div 2000) (A[child] has been financially reliant upon [man who had
been supporting her]@); Wright v. Newman, 467 S.E.2d 533, 535 (Ga. 1996) (both mother and
child Arelied upon [man=s] promise to their detriment@) Markov v. Markov 759 A.2d at 83 (Ait is
incumbent upon Appellee . . . to prove sufficiently that her reliance upon Appellant=s prior
conduct and verbal representations has resulted in a . . . loss.@)
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offspring during the imperfect state of childhood.@77 In other words, the duty comes first. One
has rights to bring up the child Ain the way he should go@ because one has an obligation to the
child. Hegel thought comparably, writing that what gave parents the right to their children=s
services was the obligation parents had to provide for them.78 This kind of relationship between
rights and responsibilities is also a common feature of communitarian thinking. Amitai Etzioni
writes that the rights that society bestows on its members Arequires community members to live
up to their social responsibilities.@79
Traditional thinkers almost certainly saw rights to children in very different terms than
we do today. Children no longer provide parents with the kind of services that they used to.80
Nonetheless, as every person who fights for custodial privileges will attest, children are still
critically valuable resources, not just to society but to the individuals who wish to maintain
relationships. Being able to take a child to the park may be the modern day equivalent of being
able to use a child=s labor on the farm, but in both cases the adult gains value from the child.
Chapter 3 ignores the foundational thinking about the relationship between rights and
responsibilities.
The only explicit reason the Principles give for inverting the traditional relationship
between rights and obligations emerges in a close reading of the Reporter=s Notes. Chapter 3's
77
78

John Locke, Two Treatises of Government 2nd Treatise '58.
Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right ' 174.

79

Amitai Etzioni, The Responsive Community: A Communitarian Perpective, 199
American Sociological Review 1, 9 (1996).
80

Naomi Cahn, Perfect Substitutes or the Real Thing, 52 Duke L.J. 1077, 1988 (2003)
(children were economically valuable until the middle of the 19th century)
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Notes cite Miller v. Miller,81 a New Jersey case which explained that imposing a support
obligation on step-parents would discourage too many people from becoming step-parents. In
other words, if Allen is worried that he might some day be responsible for child support, he will
never move in with Fred and start supporting his children. The fear is that the children will lose
both the temporary support that Allen can provide and the chance for long term support that
Allen would provide if he and Fred stayed together.
There are several curious things about this rationale. First, it is not at all clear that
potential step-parents= demand curves are as elastic as the reasoning suggests. Often times, when
someone moves in with or marries another adult with children, potential future liability is a
distant and not particularly relevant concern. Common experience and available data suggest
that people are wildly optimistic about relationships in their early stages.82 The Drafters= own
call for scrutiny of prenuptial agreements in Chapter 7 is based on what they acknowledge as
people=s tendency to overvalue present benefits, over discount future benefits and treat low
probability events as zero probability events.83 If potential step-parents behave like everyone
else, they will heavily discount the chances of breaking up and thus are unlikely to be dissuaded
by potential child support obligation that might follow if they do.
Second, the Miller logic assumes that the potential obligors care more about foregoing
obligation than embracing rights. The chance to live with and provide for children allows
81

Miller v. Miller, 478 A.2d 351 (N.J. 1984).

82

Lynn A. Baker and Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship is Above Average:
Perceptions and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 Law & Human Behav. 439,
443 (1993).
83

P. 986
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potential obligors to enjoy all of the relationship benefits that lead adults to fight for custodial
privileges in Chapter 2. Some of the courts that have been willing to impose child support
obligations on non-legal parents have done so precisely because the non-legal parent enjoyed the
benefits of parenthood.84 The ALI Principles reject this rights/obligation trade-off out of fear
that too few people will enter into relationships with children if they are worried about future
liability. Query though, why we should be so eager to award someone rights under Chapter 2 if
that same person would not have developed the relationship had she known that there might be a
financial cost. How strong can a person=s emotional commitment to a relationship be if she
would let the financial implications of the relationship control her decision to start it or stay in it?
In sum, the preference for protecting children=s emotional interests over their financial
interests is inconsistent with liberal and communitarian thinking about the relationship between
parental rights and obligations and seems somewhat blind to the recognition that the very same
concerns for consistency and expectation that underlie the expansion of relationship rights could
support the expansion of financial obligation. It also assumes that potential future obligation
will significantly detract from one=s willingness to parent a child.

D. Obligation From Volition

84

See Wade v. Wade, 536 S. 2d 1158 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1088) (Athe benefits of his
representations as the child=s father, including the child=s love and affection, his status as father .
. . and the community=s recognition of him as the father@ justify imposing a support obligation.);
Gonzalez v. Andreas, 369 A.2d 416, 418 (Pa. Super Ct. 1976)
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As the previous discussion makes clear, the ALI Principles reject the idea that obligation
can flow from functional relationship. It appears to flow only from an agreement expressing an
intent to support. To impose obligation a court must find Aaffirmative conduct,@ and a clear
agreement to assume the support obligation either before or after the child was born.85 Marriage
or cohabitation at the time of the child=s birth, coupled with affirmative conduct, can also trigger
responsibility. Agreeing to marry or cohabit with a pregnant woman serves as a proxy for an
agreement to support the child. For the most part, the intent to agree to support must be obvious
to all concerned.86
At first blush, this may seem like a sensible structure for parental obligation. We should
bind as parents only those people who agree to be parents. If one does not intend to be a parent
to a child, one should not be saddled with the obligations of a parent. Further scrutiny renders
this principle problematic, however. Chapter 3's reliance on notions of legal paternity strongly
suggest that intent should not be determinative of parenthood, and intent can be trumped if there
is another parent in the picture. Moreover, the principles applying to the dissolution of marriage
and cohabiting couples suggest that obligation can and should grow from function as well as
intent. First, thinking about parenthood, or at least fatherhood, in terms of intent, is inconsistent

85

'3.03(1) requires Aan explicit or implicit agreement or undertaking by the person to
assume a parental support obligation to the child.@ '3.03(1)(c) requires that the child be
Aconceived pursuant to an a agreement between the person and the child=s parent that they would
share responsibility for raising the child.@
86

There is some wiggle room within the ALI suggesting that one need not make one=s
intent explicit. Section 3.03(1)(a) says that an Aimplicit agreement or undertaking to assume a
parental support obligation@ can render one responsible, but that implicit agreement still has to
involve Aaffirmative conduct@ and should only be found to render one liable in Aexceptional@
circumstances, probably one in which a second parent is not available.
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with the ALI=s reliance on notions legal and biological parenthood.87 Traditional paternity rules
have never required a finding of intent to parent or intent to provide support before saddling
someone with child support payments. For unmarried men, biological connection not intent was
traditionally and still is the single most important factor in determining paternity. Boys who are
statutorily raped88 and men whose partners= lie to them about their use of birth control89 - neither
of whom have any intent to parent - are still held responsible for child support. The justification
for these rules is usually that the right to child support is the child=s right and therefore the
malfeasance of the mother should not defeat the child=s right to support.90 In one recent case, a
Florida man who, before having intercourse, entered into a Preconception Agreement with his
partner, in which she agreed not to identify him as the father or sue him for paternity, was
nonetheless held responsible for child support pursuant to a paternity adjudication because, the
court held Athe rights of support and meaningful relationship belong to the child, not the parent;
therefore neither parent can bargain away those rights.@91 It is hard to find a more complete

87

According to most state parentage acts, legal and biological paternity are one in the
same category, at least once all the biological facts are known. The biological father is the legal
father. Courts often reject this simplicity, however, in an effort to award the Abetter@ father with
parental rights. See supra text accompanying notes . . .
88

Kansas ex re. Hermesmann v. Sayer, 847 P2d 1273 (Kan. 1993); San Luis Obispo v.
Nathaniel J. 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 843 (Ct. App. 1996); Mercer County Dep=t of Soc Serv v. Alf M.,
589 NYS2d 288 (Fam. Ct. 1992).
89

Wallis v. Smith, 22 P.3d 682 (N.M. 2001) (father cannot sue in tort to recover
compensatory damages stemming from girlfriend=s misrepresentation about birth control);
Moorman v. Walker, 773 P.2d 887, 889 (Wash. 1989); Pamela P. v. Frank S., 449 NE2d 7134,
715 (NY 1983).
90
91

See supra notes (2 previous)
Budnick v. Silverman, 805 So.2d 1112, 1113 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)
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rejection of intent as a basis of parenthood.
To be fair, the ALI=s reliance on intent to determine obligation is consistent with one
growing field of parentage cases, those involving assisted reproduction. For children born as a
result of any process other than heterosexual intercourse, preconception intent is emerging as the
predominant paradigm for determining parentage. If friends get together and informally agree
that one will donate sperm so that the other can get pregnant, the preconception intent of the
parties, as manifested in explicit or implicit agreements, governs who will be held financially
responsible.92 If parties sign a surrogacy contract or participate in another arrangement that relies
on the variety reproductive technologies now available, most courts enforce those contracts in
the name of respecting the intent of the parties.93 What this means is that the reproductive
process is critical to determining whether intent to parent matters. For babies born the oldfashioned way, as in Budnick, intent to parent is irrelevant. For babies born the modern way, as
in surrogacy or insemination situations, intent to parent is determinative. By relying so heavily
on legal definitions of paternity, the ALI embraces this inconsistency. Parentage statutes
continue to use blood and presumptions and Best Interest of the Child determinations, none of
92

See R.C. v. J.R. 129 P.2d 27 (Colo. 1989) reviewing the legal commentary on the
subject and most of the decided cases. The court held that the determinative question for support
purposes is whether the sperm donor and the mother Aat the time of insemination agree that [the
sperm donor] will be the natural father.@
93

See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993); McDonald v. McDonald, 608
NYS2d 477 (App. Div. 1994). See also John Lawrence Hill, What does it Mean to be a Parent?
The Claims of Biology as the Basis for Parental Rights, 66 NYU L. Rev. 353 (1991); Lori
Andrews, Legal and Ethical Aspects of New Reproductive Technologies, 29 Clin. Obstet. & Gyn
190 (1986). But see Marsha Garrison, Law making for Baby Making: An Interpretive
Approach to the Determination of Legal Parentage, 113 Harv. L. Rev 835 (2000) (arguing that
parental determinations in cases of reproductive technologies should be governed by existing
family law rules, many of which do not honor intent)
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which necessarily measure intent, while the reproductive technology contracts and the
exceptional circumstances delineated in the ALI will rely on intent to determine parental
obligation.
Second, the volitional acts that could render someone responsible for child support do not
necessarily render someone liable for child support if there is a source of income elsewhere. The
restrictions in '3.03(2) caution against finding a support obligation if Athe child otherwise has
two parents who owe the child a duty of support and are able and available to provide support.@
It is not clear, from either a child-centered perspective or an obligor-centered perspective, why
this alternative source of revenue should be relevant to the volitional actor=s responsibility.
From a child-centered perspective, the potential parent-by-estoppel may be providing
critical amounts of support. As discussed earlier, a step-parent or step-parent like figure can
provide a child with a standard of living to which the child becomes accustomed and the loss of
which could cause the child significant harm.94 Another legal parent who is Aable and available
to provide support@ may only be able to provide a fraction of what the potential parent-byestoppel can provide.95 This appears to make little difference to the ALI.
From a obligor-centered perspective, the support duty, despite its volitional character,
seems remarkably arbitrary. One=s ultimate responsibility depends not on what others relied on
nor what one promised nor what one actually did, it depends on the availability of someone
whom one likely does not know and may never have met. Consider the not-so-uncommon

94

See supra notes

.

95

The amount an obligor owes is based on a what the obligor earns. If the legal parent
does not have much, there is not much to get from him.
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situation of a man who finds out that he actually is not the biological father of his wife or girlfriend=s child.96 He can accept that child as his own, provide for the child financially, develop or
continue a relationship with the child and still be relieved of obligation if the biological father
surfaces.97 If the biological father does not surface, he can be held responsible. His obligation is
based largely on the chance finding of the biological parent.
Finally, Chapter 3's insistence on volition is inconsistent with the treatment of obligation
elsewhere in the Principles. Chapter 6 allows obligation between cohabitants to grow from
either Alosses that arise from the changes in life opportunities and expectations caused by the
adjustments individuals ordinarily make over the course of a relationship@98 or from Adisparities
in the financial impact of a short relationship on the partners= postseparation lives.@99
In other words, there is a recognition that adults adjust their lives and expectations in the course
of sharing a household with someone. Chapter 6 endorses the view that the law should mediate
some of the harshness that can follow when the household breaks up, regardless of whether the
parties agreed to provide for each other after they separated. This means that one=s former
cohabitant can incur an on-going duty to support despite never having manifested an intent to
assume that obligation. Thus, it is actually easier to become obligated to an adult who
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Markov v. Markov, 758 A.2d 75 (Md. 2000) (husband did not know he was not the
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theocratically has some ability to provide for him or herself, than it is to become obligated to a
child, who has no such ability.
III. Conclusion
In embracing the case-by-case functional approach to rights in chapter 2, the ALI
Comments quote a Maryland court with approval: AFormula or computer solutions in child
custody matters are impossible because of the unique character of each case and the subjective
nature of the evaluation and decisions that must be made.@100 The Comments offer no reason for
why particular obligations are rooted less in unique or subjective factors than are custody
decisions, but as the foregoing makes clear, the Principles clearly reject the case-by-case
approach to obligation. Severing the approach to rights and responsibilities in this way, even if
done without explanation, may nonetheless make sound, risk-averse policy sense. If the state is
unwilling to accept responsibility; if men will not form relationships with women or children if
those relationships could lead to obligation, if we have so little faith in judges= ability to make
case-by-case support determinations, then Chapter 3's approach may be our best option.
The most straightforward way to alleviate the harm done by too few financial resources
for children would be for the United States, like almost all industrialized countries, to develop a
more comprehensive system of state support for children. This kind of system would correspond
with Chapter 2's expansion of state control over child-rearing decisions. Politically, however, as
the Drafters acknowledge, this country is a long, long way from accepting significantly more
communal responsibility for children.101 Tinkering with the traditional approach to obligation
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Comments p. 104 (Taylor v. Taylor)
AWhat distinguishes the US from other wealthy western countries is its disinclination
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without being able to use the state as a guarantor may simply to be too risky.
Moreover, once we cease holding traditional parents automatically accountable and
instead start relying on notions of function, expectation, reliance, or intent we run the risk that no
one other than a primary parent will actually incur the legal obligation to support. Perhaps, as
the Miller court in New Jersey warned in the step-parent situation, non-biological fathers will
not marry or move in with women who already have children. Perhaps men will cease providing
for children in the way they do now. Perhaps grandparents like the Bannisters and grandmothers
everywhere will cease forming bonds with children out of fear that such bonds will lead to
financial obligation. If these are realistic fears, then the asymmetric approach to rights and
obligation may protect children in the best way we can. We protect children=s emotional
expectations and not their financial ones because the protection of their financial expectations
would undermine the very existence of potential emotional relationships.

to act as a primary guarantor of children=s economic dependency.@ Comments p. 429
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If we moved to a support system based more on notions of function, expectation or
reliance, we would also likely have to return to non-mechanistic measures of obligation. The
binary parent formula offered in '3.05 may be based on an idealized binary biological model of
parenthood, but, like all child-support formulas adopted in the last 30 years, it takes away the
discretion and bias that led to wildly inconsistent and often unacceptably small child support
awards.102 Premising a support system on function, reliance or expectation would most likely
require tailoring different support awards to reflect the extent of function, reliance and
expectation. This type of case-by-case analysis would preclude the use of formulas. It might be
that we have so little faith in the judiciary=s ability to formulate and enforce case-specific orders
that we are better off living with formulas based on counterfactual norms than with theories of
support based on parenthood as lived.
The rigidity of the proposed model does diminish the likelihood that the parties,
negotiating on their own, will trade custody for support. A bright line rule with regard to
support, like the one offered in the Principles, reduces the opportunities for strategic bargaining.
The comments make no mention of this concern, but it may have played a role in their strict
allegiance to a formula. There are several ways to expand and/or incorporate certain formulas
(thus reducing strategic behavior) while recognizing the heterogeneous nature of contemporary
parenthood, however. First, the formula could still be used in situations involving the binary
biological ideal or in all divorce proceedings. Second, relatively blunt, alternative models that
allocated responsibility based on a percentage of visitation time could provide enough clarity to
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See Nancy Thoennes et. Al. The Impact of Child-Support Guidelines on Award
Adequacy, Award Availability and Case Processing Efficiency, 25 Fam.L. Q. 325, 326 (1991)
(citing studies).
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reduce strategic bargaining while incorporating different theories of obligation. Third, courts
could adopt a presumption in favor of a primary formula, but that presumption could be
overcome with facts comparable to the kind that lead to multiple parenthood under Chapter 2.
In short, it would be perfectly possible to minimize strategic behavior with regard to bargaining
over custody, without limiting our ability to incorporate multiple sources of parental obligation.
Finally, Chapter 3's ambivalent treatment of intent may be necessary in light of the
uncertainty surrounding men=s behavior in the absence of biological obligation. To embrace
intent as the standard by which we should determine parenthood, the way courts now do in the
reproductive technology area and the way the ALI reluctantly starts to do with its
acknowledgment that affirmative conduct plus agreement can lead to obligation, could lead to
the erosion of traditional paternity law. Traditional paternity law roots obligation in genetic
connection. If the law uses intent, not blood, as the lynchpin of parenthood then some men could
escape parental obligation. Men who are unwilling to forego reproductive sex but have no intent
to parent can currently be held responsible for child support. If we dispensed with biology, these
men could have reproductive sex without having to worry about child support. Of course,
currently, most of these men probably end up living with children and functioning as fathers.103
Therefore, they could be held accountable under a functional, reliance or expectation approach to
obligation, but again, if they were worried enough about future liability, they might not enter into
those relationships.104
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This seems unlikely. If these men tended to worry about future obligation, chances
are they would be much more diligent about using birth control.
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***********
Changes in both social norms and technology have altered, fundamentally, how people
become and function as parents. It blinks reality to assume that children will be cared or
provided for within the confines of a binary biological norm. The binary biological model may
still express our ideal but it does not reflect our world. Chapter 2 of the Principles embraces
reality. Chapter 3 of the Principles holds on tight to the traditional ideal, unwilling to answer the
question of what should make someone responsible for a child, and perhaps fearful of how little
support would actually be there, if we embraced the reality of contemporary parenting.
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